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Abstract
In a simple reciprocal dumping model of trade, this study scrutinizes the strategic
role of trade and commodity taxes as environmental instruments when consumption
of an imported product generates pollution. The results suggest that for su ciently
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ferred over import tari s, and compared to the case of trade policies, free trade can
be welfare dominating even for higher values of the marginal disutility from pollu-
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This study employs a reciprocal dumping model of trade and scrutinizes the strategic role
of commodity taxes and trade policy tools when environmental pollution is generated by
final consumption of an imported product, and delineates the implications of domestic
and foreign policy tools on countries’ integration through international trade. The novel
contribution of this paper is (i) to capture asymmetries among trading partners in terms
of their marginal disutility from pollution and in terms of how much they account for
environmental pollution when deciding on their (domestic/trade) policy measures, and
(ii) to focus on environmental degradation that is caused by final consumption of a prod-
uct imported from a trading partner. The literature has almost exclusively assumed that
all countries understand and agree on their contribution to environmental pollution, and
thus appropriately account for this in their policy tools. This, however, presumes that
policy-makers around the globe have similar agendas and are not influenced by their own
idiosyncratic environments. By contrast, as is discussed below, empirical evidence sug-
gests that there is heterogeneity in countries’ perceived marginal disutility from pollution
(especially caused by idiosyncratic political or trade-related concerns).
The literature also has focused mostly on emissions from production and on the e ects of
environmental tax policies on competition among firms, on international trade and firms’
location choices, and on social welfare. Statistical evidence, however, suggests that most
industrialized countries have a larger CO2 footprint than their CO2 production, and that
emissions from final consumption of imported products constitute a significantly large
share of their total emissions.1 Bang et al. (2008) show that, in 2001, (i) the EU’s
consumption of goods and services generated 4,700 million tonnes of CO2 emissions, 500
million tonnes of which were generated mainly from imported products; (ii) while some
countries (e.g., Latvia and Lithuania) have relatively low domestic emissions and large
amounts embodied in their imports from the rest of the world (e.g., Russia), all OECD
countries (except for Australia and Canada) have a CO2 consumption overshoot compared
with production; and (iii) all EU countries have a CO2 consumption overshoot in their
bilateral trade with China. A similar general picture exists as far as other pollutants
(e.g., ground level ozone, or mercury emissions) are concerned; see Holladay (2008) for
details.
The literature identifies di erent sources through which trade a ects environmental pol-
lution: (i) the scale e ect that tends to increase pollution from production as a country’s
1Recent studies argue that indirect emissions from consumption should be considered when measuring
emissions embodied in trade as indirect emissions are higher than direct ones, especially in developed
countries (e.g., see, inter alia, Bang et al. 2008; Barrett et al., 2013; Marques et al., 2013; Sato, 2013).
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economic activity is expected to increase with trade; (ii) the technique e ect that tends to
improve environmental quality as demand for quality is expected to increase with trade;
and (iii) the composition e ect that tends to either increase or decrease environmental
pollution with a net e ect depending on how trade changes the composition of production
and consumption (Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Copeland and Taylor, 1994; Antweiler
et al., 2001). In a perfectly competitive trade model that incorporates environmental
pollution (as measured by SO2 concentrations), Antweiler et al. (2001) find that trade
liberalization reduces pollution. Frankel and Rose (2005) also find some evidence that
openness to trade reduces pollution, as far as SO2 and NO2 emissions are concerned.
Following the seminal paper by Brander and Spencer (1984; 1985), a number of stud-
ies has applied the strategic trade policy analysis to the strategic environmental policy
debate. In general, such studies employ oligopoly models of trade to examine the impli-
cations of unilateral environmental policies and show that non-cooperative Nash policies
may lead to environmental dumping such that countries adopt laxer environmental poli-
cies. They may impose environmental taxes that are less than Pigouvian taxes (that is,
the marginal tax rate is less than the marginal environmental damage), and such environ-
mental taxes, together with import tari s (e.g., as in Tanguay, 2001), may lead to a race
to the bottom (in terms of environmental standards) and thus, welfare may deteriorate
with trade liberalization.2
The strategic use of tari s and subsidies can be deemed to be rationalizable in oligopolis-
tic markets. Countries, however, lose their degree of freedom in using such trade policy
tools with their free trade agreements. Similarly, the strategic use of environmental pol-
icy instruments (if successfully enforced) may be e ective when production is the main
source of pollution, but they may not be applicable when consumption is considered to be
the main source of pollution.3 As internationally traded commodities are taxed mostly
2Eliminating trade policy tools and using environmental taxes (e.g., as in Walz and Wellisch, 1997; or as
in Burquet and Sempere, 2003), or allowing for R&D investments by firms responding to environmental
standards (e.g., as in Ulph, 1996), however, may reduce incentives to adopt laxer environmental stan-
dards, and welfare may improve with trade liberalization. Moreover, in such models, Barrett (1994)
indicates that the industry structure is also important, that is, if the industry is characterized by
Bertrand oligopoly (price competition), rather than Cournot oligopoly (quantity competition), then
the results are reversed, such that the unilaterally optimal environmental taxes are higher than the
Pigouvian taxes. Also, the demand elasticity and the shape of the damage function are crucial in terms
of welfare results.
3While di erent explanations may be o ered, an obvious justification is the observation that environmen-
tal taxes are not used to discriminate products according to the source country. Moreover, in Article
III of the WTO, National Treatment imposes certain constraints on domestic policy so as to make sure
that countries do not engage in protectionist discrimination against foreign products; for details, see for
example Ferrara et al. (2015).
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where they are consumed (e.g., see McCracken and Stähler, 2010; McCracken, 2015), and
as countries can freely set their commodity taxes, when consumption is the main source
of externality, commodity taxes can be used strategically (just like the strategic use of
trade policy tools) even in the case of a free trade agreement. The strategic role of com-
modity taxes as environmental instruments when consumption of an imported product
generates pollution and the implications of the strategic use of this policy instrument on
countries’ integration through international trade have not yet received much attention
in the literature.4
There are few papers worth mentioning. Ferrara et al. (2015) consider emissions from
consumption and scrutinize the welfare implications of the WTO’s National Treatment
clause in Article III. Given quality di erences among products, they show that the WTO’s
restriction on non-discriminatory internal measures does not necessarily lead to higher
(lower) global environmental damage (welfare). Lai and Hu (2008) consider consumption-
generated externalities and delineate optimal policy measures when products are di er-
entiated and when the trading partners cooperate in their trade policies. They show that,
while cooperating in trade policies, if the trading partners do not cooperate in environ-
mental taxes, this may lead to a counter-intuitive result that each country will subsidize
the foreign firm only that imports a polluting good, especially when pollution is su -
ciently high. They conclude that this would be politically infeasible, and thus in such a
situation, zero tari s would emerge as the cooperative trade policy. By taking into ac-
count consumption externalities and product-specific standards, Essaji (2010) shows that
tari  reduction leads to higher standards only if the marginal impact of product standards
on the externality increases substantially in consumption. In a series of research, Fujiwara
(2010a, 2010b, 2012) focuses on transport costs, bilateral tari  reductions and environ-
mental taxes under consumption externality, and shows that, as compared to autarky,
trade may lead to welfare losses, and reductions in tari s may tend to increase emission
taxes. Fujiwara’s papers, to some extent, follow earlier research by Kayalica and Kayalica
(2005) and Kayalica and Yilmaz (2006) scrutinizing the relationship between import tar-
i s, export subsidies and emission taxes under consumption externalities. Another related
paper is by Wu (2019) that extends Haufler et al. (2005) to production externalities, and
also considers both consumption externalities and import tari s as a robustness check
for the results. The results from that robustness check suggest that destination-based
consumption taxes might be better than origin-based production taxes when there is an
import tari  under consumption externalities. Wu (2019), however, focuses solely on com-
4Considering consumption of a product that creates pollution, Copeland and Taylor (1995) show that
the optimal policy will be a consumption tax that equals the marginal environmental damage, and that
trade improves welfare especially if there exists a perfectly costless institutional structure with well
intentions. Though it is worth noting that their analysis focuses on a competitive framework.
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paring destination-based consumption taxes versus origin-based production taxes, unlike
this paper focusing on Nash trade policies and (non-discriminatory) consumption taxes,
and on their role as strategic environmental instruments, as well as on the implications
of these two policy tools on gains from trade under consumption-based environmental
pollution.
This study would like to make further progress on consumption-based pollution. In a
simple intra-industry trade model with imperfect competition, it scrutinizes the strategic
role of trade and commodity taxes as environmental instruments and demonstrates that
the externality generated by consumption of an imported good, as measured by countries’
marginal disutility from pollution, can have detrimental e ects on countries’ economic
integration, especially when the trading partners are asymmetric in terms of how much
they account for environmental pollution when deciding on their (domestic/trade) pol-
icy measures. That is, departing from the existing literature, we would like to introduce
some heterogeneity in countries’ perceived marginal disutility from pollution. Our results
suggest that while a substantially high marginal disutility from pollution can interrupt
bilateral trade and cross-hauling can cease to exist, in the case of a su ciently small
marginal disutility from pollution, both trade and commodity taxes are deemed neces-
sary so as to e ectively address consumption-generated pollution. The tax rates, however,
are less than Pigouvian taxes due to Cournot competition. For su ciently small values
of the marginal disutility from pollution, the country fully accounting for consumption-
generated pollution when deciding on its optimal policy measure prefers commodity taxes
over import tari s, and compared to the case of trade policies, free trade can be main-
tained for higher values of the marginal disutility from pollution when commodity taxes
are used strategically as environmental instruments.
Also we extend our analysis to a symmetric case where imports pollute in both countries
(fully accounted for in each country when choosing the optimal policy measure) and where
there is transboundary pollution between the two countries. Our results confirm that the
main finding holds to some extent also for such extensions. We show that (i) su cient
asymmetries between the countries in terms of their marginal disutility from pollution
may jeopardize bilateral trade relationships between the countries; (ii) free trade welfare-
dominates autarky only for su ciently small marginal disutility from pollution and for
su ciently low transboundary pollution; (iii) both Nash trade and domestic policies may
prove to be helpful in addressing consumption-based pollution and we solve for threshold
values of marginal disutility from pollution (decreasing with transboundary pollution)
above which such policies welfare-dominate free trade; and (iv) we solve for a threshold
value of marginal disutility from pollution below which domestic policies welfare-dominate
trade policies when addressing pollution from consumption of imports.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
and scrutinizes the welfare implications of imposing import tari s when consumption
of an imported product generates pollution. Section 3 looks at consumption-generated
pollution under free trade, and discusses the welfare implications. Section 4 analyzes the
implications of the use of commodity taxes as environmental instruments, and compares
the results with those discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Section 5 extends the analysis to
a symmetric case and includes in the model also transboundary pollution and compares
the results with those discussed in Sections 2, 3 and 4. Section 6 o ers some concluding
remarks. For convenience, most of the proofs and technical details have been relegated
to the Appendix.
2 The model
Following the seminal paper by Brander and Krugman (1983), we employ a simple model
of intra-industry trade, and examine the nexus between trade and the environment. We
consider two countries, Home and Foreign, which are identical with respect to consumers’
preferences and market size, and two firms (one in each country), which are identical
with respect to production technology and costs, and which produce a good with zero
marginal cost and compete by quantities against each other in both countries. While a
di erent packaging material for the good is used for domestic consumption (that is free
of environmental damage) and for imports (that causes environmental pollution where
the good is consumed), consumers in both countries ignore this di erence and regard
the good as homogeneous. Thus, the inverse demand function in country i is given by
pi = a ≠ bQi, i = {h, f}, where h and f stand for Home and Foreign, respectively; pi is
the price of the good in country i; a and b denote market size and the slope of the inverse
demand function, respectively; and Qi = xi + yi is the aggregate output in country i,
such that yi is the local production in country i and xi is country i’s imports from the
other country. Markets are segmented such that each firm considers each country as a
separate market.
In this section, we focus on the case of no free trade agreement between the two countries,
and thus trade may be subject to tari s. To simplify the analysis, we assume away
transport costs of exporting/importing throughout the analysis. We consider a simple,
two-stage, non-cooperative game. In the first stage, the governments decide on their
import tari s that maximize their local welfare. Let th and tf denote the tari  rates
imposed by Home and Foreign, respectively. In the second stage, given the tari  rates,
the firms compete against each other by quantities in both countries, such that each firm
simultaneously, and non-cooperatively, decides on the outputs that maximize profits in
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both markets. Firm i that locates in country i and exports to country j, i, j = {h, f}, i ”=
j, will earn aggregate profits, denoted fii, that is the sum of the profits from the domestic
and the foreign market. We solve the game backwards such that we start from the second
stage (the Cournot game between the two firms) and search for the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. The maximization problem of firm i is
max
{xjØ0, yiØ0}
fii = piyi + (pj ≠ tj)xj ; i, j = {h, f}, i ”= j.
From the first-order conditions, we find that the (optimal) outputs supplied to country i





(a ≠ 2ti)/3b if 0 Æ ti < a/2




3b , where i = {h, f}. (1b)
Using the expressions for the optimal outputs, given by equation (1), we can derive the







; i, j = {h, f}, i ”= j, (2)
where x and y are given by equation (1). In the first stage of the game, each government
unilaterally decides on its import tari  rate that maximizes its local welfare, which we
will refer to as Nash (non-cooperative) trade policies. Country i’s welfare can be expressed
as the sum of the domestic firm’s profits (from both local sales and exports) fii, consumer
surplus b(xi + yi)2/2, tari  revenues tixi, and disutility from environmental pollution.
The existing literature predominantly studies the symmetric case that all countries ap-
propriately account for environmental degradation in their policy tools, and thus they are
symmetric in terms of their perceived marginal disutility from pollution. We defer this
case until Section 5 where we consider not only a symmetric case, but also transboundary
pollution as a robustness check for the results of the asymmetric case. Departing from
the existing literature, we initially consider the case that Home and Foreign have di erent
agendas. Recall that (i) domestic consumption of the good produced by Home does not
cause environmental pollution; whereas (ii) the good (otherwise homogeneous) produced
by Foreign for Home’s consumption (imports by Home) has a packaging material that
causes environmental pollution where it is consumed. Thus, Home’s consumption of the
good imported from Foreign is the main source of pollution in Home. When deciding
on the optimal policy measure (tari s or consumption taxes), Home fully accounts for
environmental pollution generated by consumption of the good imported from Foreign,
and there is constant marginal disutility from pollution, denoted by ”h. Thus, in the
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case of non-cooperative trade policies, this amounts to Home’s local welfare decreasing
by ”hxh, ”h > 0. As is already discussed, we would like to introduce some heterogeneity
in the countries’ perceived marginal disutility from pollution. There are many di erent
ways by which such asymmetry may be introduced. Without loss of generality, and to
keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that although Foreign’s consumption of
imports from Home generates pollution in Foreign, there are some non-pecuniary bene-
fits, denoted   (e.g., political benefits o ered by some interest groups in Foreign, etc.)
that the policy makers in Foreign will take into account. In what follows, we will as-
sume that such non-pecuniary benefits are at a level that just compensates for negative
consumption externalities in Foreign (i.e.,   = ”fxf ).5 Such non-pecuniary benefits a ect-
ing policy makers’ decisions are not so uncommon and can be also due to trade-related
concerns. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some countries may opt to overlook envi-
ronmental degradation when pro-trade concerns dominate environmental concerns. For
example, according to the European Commission’s 2001 report on European Packaging
Waste Management Systems (EC DGX1.E.3, 2001), Sweden removed the reuse targets
for bottles in 2001 and closed down the deposit refund system already in 1998 due to
sharp decreases in bulk imports.




h = fih +
b(xh + yh)2
2 + (th ≠ ”h)xh, (3a)
W
t
f = fif +
b(xf + yf )2
2 + tfxf , (3b)
where the optimal outputs, xi and yi, and the maximized profits, fii, i = {h, f}, are given
by equations (1) and (2), respectively, and where superscript t denotes the case that the
two countries adopt Nash trade policies. Given   = ”fxf , let us drop the subscript from
Home’s marginal disutility from pollution such that ”h = ”, which can be interpreted
also as a measure of heterogeneity in the two countries’ perceived marginal disutility
from pollution. Di erentiating W th and W tf , given by equation (3), w.r.t. th and tf ,
respectively, and setting the results equal to zero (i.e., ˆW ti (t)/ˆti = 0, i = {h, f}) and
solving for th and tf yield the welfare-maximizing tari  rates such that 6
t
ú











5As this may feel rather a strong assumption, in Section 5, we relax this assumption and carry out
the analysis for the case imports pollute in both countries and both countries fully account for their
consumption-based pollution.
6Note that the objective function is strictly concave, that is, the su cient condition for a unique maxi-
mum, tú = argmax W t(t), is fulfilled.
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As is clear from equation (4), in the presence of consumption-generated pollution, Home’s
optimal tari  rate exceeds Foreign’s tari  rate should the policy maker in Foreign evalu-
ates Foreign’s marginal utility from pollution at zero.
Proposition 1 In the case that countries adopt Nash trade policies, and that the good
imported from a trading partner generates pollution, the importing country that appropri-
ately accounts for pollution (Home) attempts to internalize the consumption externality
by imposing a higher tari  rate, although the increase in the per-unit tari  rate is less
than the marginal disutility from pollution.
The following remarks are in order. For any given Foreign tari  rate, increasing the tari 
rate in Home (within the relevant range túh < a/2 as is given by equation (1a)) increases
the local firm’s aggregate profits by increasing its domestic market share. Aggregate
consumption in Home, however, decreases as the decrease in imports is more than the
increase in local sales, and thus consumer surplus decreases. Although increasing the tari 
rate in Home decreases imports, and thus pollution decreases (and so does disutility from
environmental degradation), tari  revenues also decrease, leading Home to compromise
and increase the per-unit tari  rate by less than the marginal disutility from pollution.
The implicit assumption here is that cross-hauling exists, that is, the marginal disutility
from pollution is su ciently small (” < a/4) such that the tari  rate maximizing Home’s
welfare is still less than the prohibitive tari  rate (i.e., (a + 2”)/3 < a/2).
Lemma 1 A su ciently high marginal disutility from pollution may jeopardize bilateral
trade such that cross-hauling may cease to exist, and there may be only one-way trade.
It should be noted that Lemma 1 assumes both countries can freely choose their tari 
rates for their imports, consumption of which pollutes environment.7 Lemma 1 may be
interpreted as follows: greater heterogeneity between the two countries in terms of their
perceived marginal disutility from pollution can be trade disrupting. A su ciently high
marginal disutility from pollution (i.e., ” > a/4) leads Home to impose a tari  above the
prohibitive rate, in which case exporting is not profitable for the firm located in Foreign,
while exporting to Foreign will still be profitable for the firm located in Home. In the
next section, we scrutinize the question whether (and under which circumstances) free
trade would be welfare dominating.
7While environmental concerns may be, to some extent, a legitimate reason to increasing tari  rates espe-
cially when consumption of imports generate pollution (similar to the arguments over goods associated
with national security for which the WTO has given its members more flexibility), in most cases, setting
tari  rates are subject to some limits. Throughout this paper, we refrain from such discussions, and
assume simply that both countries non-cooperatively choose their tari  rates that maximize welfare.
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3 Consumption-generated pollution under free trade
In this section, we first look at the case of autarky in both countries such that firms have
monopoly power in their respective domestic markets. In such a situation, each firm is
active only in the domestic market, produces at the monopoly level for this market (i.e.,
xi = 0, and yi = a/2b, i = {h, f}), and earns monopoly profits (i.e., fii = b(a/2b)2,
i = {h, f}). There is no trade, and thus no tari  revenue in either country, nor is
there environmental pollution that has to be accounted for. Using equation (3), it is
straightforward to show that W úai = 3a2/8b, i = {h, f}. Note that superscript a stands
for autarky.
In case of free trade (compared to autarky), market competition increases, decreasing
the two firms’ market share in their respective domestic markets (moving from monopoly
to international duopoly), while each firm shares the market across borders such that
xi = yi = a/3b, i = {h, f}. This implies an increase in each firm’s aggregate profits,
and an increase in total consumption in each country. Welfare would improve with free
trade in both countries (compared to autarky) had there been no pollution such that
W
úft
i (” = 0) = 4a2/9b > W úai = 3a2/8b, i = {h, f}, where superscript ft stands for free
trade. In case of pollution from consumption of an imported good, however, this result




















Comparing equation (5) with autarky welfare immediately leads to
Proposition 2 Free trade would not be welfare-dominating autarky in the country ac-
counting for consumption-generated pollution (Home) if the marginal disutility from pol-
lution is su ciently high.
Free trade decreases local sales and increases imports (which increase pollution from
consumption). Although free trade increases both total consumption in a given country
and the aggregate profits of a given firm, with which welfare increases, a su ciently high
marginal disutility from pollution (i.e., ” > 5a/24) leads welfare to decrease by more
than gains from free trade. Note that free trade does not leave any room for a trade
policy that could internalize the negative externality of consuming the imported good.
As for Foreign where marginal disutility from pollution is evaluated at zero, compared
to autarky, free trade always improves local welfare. In the case that Home does not
allow for imports from Foreign (i.e., ” > 5a/24), Foreign will be better o  by opening its
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market to trade and by imposing an import tari  (as compared to autarky and to the
case it allows Home to export to its market freely). The intuition is that, in the case of
one-way trade (from Home to Foreign), imposing a tari  not only generates additional
revenues, but also increases the domestic firm’s market share (as compared to the case of
one-way free trade). There exists an optimal import tari  rate (tf = a/3) at which welfare
is maximized such that the decrease in welfare due to a decrease in total consumption
(with an import tari ) is overcompensated by the increase in welfare due to an increase
in the domestic firm’s profits and in tari  revenues. Also, as compared to autarky, Home
will be better o  in such a situation, because there will be no change in consumption, nor
will there be disutility from pollution generated by consumption of the imported good,
yet it will export to Foreign, which will increase the local firm’s profits. It is now clear
that given the asymmetry between the two countries in terms of how much they account
for negative consumption externality when deciding on the optimal tari s, the size of the
marginal disutility from pollution generated by consumption of the imported good may
lead to di erent trade regimes:
Proposition 3 One-way trade (from Home to Foreign) that is subject to an import tari 
imposed by Foreign may be welfare dominating for a su ciently high marginal disutility
from pollution (i.e., ” > a/4). If, however, the marginal disutility from pollution takes
some intermediate values (i.e., a/6 < ” < a/4), then the two countries may find it
optimal to engage in bilateral trade and adopt Nash trade policies. Free trade may be
welfare dominating only if the marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently low (i.e.,
” < a/6).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
It is now clear that Nash trade policies become important in the presence of pollution,
as they may be used not only to generate tari  revenues, to increase the domestic firm’s
market share, and to correct domestic distortions, but also to restrict imports so as to
decrease pollution generated by consumption of the imported good.
4 Commodity taxes as environmental instruments
In this section, we turn our attention to domestic policies. In the case of product dif-
ferentiation and trade policy cooperation, Lai and Hu (2008) have shown that there is
a negative relationship between cooperative tari  rates and environmental taxes, espe-
cially when they are used together. If, however, there is no product di erentiation and
no cooperation in trade policy, then allowing for both domestic and trade policy will be
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inconsequential. When both policy tools are used together, it is straightforward to show
in this model that in equilibrium, both countries impose positive import tari s above the
prohibitive rate so as to ensure there is no trade, and they subsidize local consumption
such that the first-best is attained with no trade, and thus with no further insight.8 We
scrutinize domestic policies when there is free trade (such that there will be no room for a
trade policy), and delineate commodity taxes employed as environmental instruments in
the absence of environmental taxes. As is already discussed, there are certain constraints
on domestic policies: domestic taxes cannot be used to discriminate against foreign goods.
Thus in this model, commodity taxes are non-discriminatory, and apply to both domestic
consumption and consumption of imports. Simply, following real practices, we assume
away commodity taxes that may discriminate products according to the source country.
As in the preceding sections, we consider a two-stage non-cooperative game between
firms, and between governments, and solve the game backwards for the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. In the first stage, governments now decide on their commodity taxes
that maximize their local welfare. We denote by ·h and ·f , commodity taxes imposed
by Home and Foreign, respectively. Firms take commodity taxes as given, and decide on
their outputs (both for the domestic and the foreign market) that maximize the profits in
both markets. Once again, let fii denote the aggregate profits (the sum of the profits from
the domestic and the foreign market) of the firm that locates in country i and exports to
country j, i, j = {h, f}, i ”= j. The maximization problem of the firms is now
max
{xjØ0,yiØ0}
fii = (pi ≠ ·i)yi + (pj ≠ ·j)xj ; i, j = {h, f}, i ”= j.
From the first-order conditions, we find that the (optimal) outputs supplied to country i
by (from country i’s perspective) the domestic firm and the foreign firm are, respectively,




(a ≠ ·i)/3b if 0 Æ ·i < a
0 if ·i Ø a
; i = {h, f}. (6)
Using the expressions for the optimal outputs, given by equation (6), we can derive the
aggregate profits for each firm as in equation (2), where x and y are now given by equation
(6). In the first-stage of the game, each government unilaterally decides on the commodity
tax rate that maximizes its local welfare, which we refer to as Nash (non-cooperative)
domestic policies. As in the preceding sections, country i’s welfare can expressed as the
sum of the domestic firm’s aggregate profits fii, given by equation (2), consumer surplus
b(xi + yi)2/2, where yi and xi are given by equation (6), and tax revenues, ·i(xi + yi).
In addition, negative consumption externalities are present in both Home and Foreign,
8To save space, we did not include this case in the paper. Computations are, however, available upon
request. See Koska and Stähler (2016) also for a general proof and for further discussions.
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and non-pecuniary benefits simply compensate for negative externalities only in Foreign.
Thus Home and Foreign choose the tax rates ·h and ·f to maximize, respectively,
W
·
h = fih +
b(xh + yh)2
2 + ·h(xh + yh) ≠ ”xh, (7a)
W
·
f = fif +
b(xf + yf )2
2 + ·f (xf + yf ), (7b)
where superscript · denotes the case that the two countries adopt Nash domestic policies
(commodity taxes). Di erentiating W ·h and W ·f , given by equation (7), w.r.t. ·h and ·f ,
respectively, and setting the results equal to zero (i.e., ˆW ·i (· )/ˆ·i = 0, i = {h, f}), and










f = 0¸ ˚˙ ˝
Optimal tax
(no disutility)
, for any ” > 0. (8)
As is clear from equation (8), when there is no pollution from consumption of the imported
good (i.e.,when ” = 0) - or if some non-pecuniary benefits are present and just compensate
negative consumption externalities (as in Foreign) - then the optimal (non-discriminatory)
commodity tax rate is equal to zero. The reason is that, for any given commodity
tax rate imposed by the other country, increasing the tax rate (imposing a positive
tax rate) generates positive tax revenues for the government, with which local welfare
increases. That said, a positive commodity tax increases the market price and decreases
local consumption, and both consumer surplus and the domestic firm’s profits from local
sales decrease, with which local welfare decreases. These e ects of a positive commodity
tax, however, cancel out each other (the profit-shifting incentive and the incentive for
domestic correction eliminate each other) especially in the case of a linear inverse demand
function. If, however, there is pollution from consumption of the imported good that the
importing country appropriately accounts for - if ” > 0 (as in Home) - then there is an
additional incentive to impose a positive commodity tax rate, which is the incentive for
environmental correction that attempts to internalize negative consumption externality.
Proposition 4 In the case that countries adopt Nash domestic policies (commodity taxes)
under free trade, the importing country that appropriately accounts for pollution attempts
to internalize the consumption externality by imposing a positive commodity tax rate. This
(positive) optimal tax rate is, however, less than the marginal disutility from pollution.
Note that in both Nash trade and domestic policies (import tari s and commodity taxes),
the incentive for domestic correction of distortions is present. Using Nash trade policies,
9Note that the objective function is strictly concave, that is, the su cient condition for a unique maxi-
mum, · ú = argmax W · (· ), is fulfilled.
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governments shift profits not only from foreign firms to their treasury via tari  revenues,
but also from foreign firms to domestic firms, which is mainly due to Cournot competition.
Using Nash domestic policies, however, the domestic country shifts profits from both the
domestic and foreign firms to its treasury via tax revenues (provided the policy tool is non-
discriminatory), that is, consumption of both the locally-produced and the imported good
decreases, only the latter of which, however, increases welfare via decreasing disutility
from pollution in addition to positive tax revenues.
We can compute the maximized welfare levels, W ú·h and W ú·f , by substituting the optimal
commodity tax rates, given by equation (8), back into the welfare expressions, given by
equation (7). Comparing W úfth , given by equation (5), and W ú·h , we can show that
the optimal commodity tax rate imposed by Home decreases pollution by decreasing
consumption and increases local welfare above the level that would have been maintained
had there been free trade and no commodity taxes imposed (W ú·h Ø W
úft
h for any ” :





















It is straightforward to show that commodity taxes imposed by Home decreases welfare
in Foreign and that if the marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently high (i.e.,
” > 2a), then Home’s optimal tax rate exceeds the prohibitive tax rate (see equation (6)),
in which case consumption may not be possible, while there may be one-way trade (from
Home to Foreign). In such a situation, autarky may be considered. Proposition 2 has
shown that free trade would not be welfare-dominating autarky in the importing country
accounting for consumption-generated pollution (Home), provided the size of its marginal
disutility from pollution is su ciently high such that ” > 5a/24. Following Proposition
2 and equation (9), we can show that in the presence of non-discriminatory commodity
taxes, free trade can be welfare dominating not only when ” Æ 5a/24 (in which case the
importing country accounting for consumption-generated pollution imposes a positive
commodity tax rate) but also when ” > 5a/24.
We can now argue that
Proposition 5 In the presence of non-discriminatory Nash domestic policies, compared
to the case of Nash trade policies, free trade can be welfare dominating also for higher
values of the marginal disutility from pollution such that 5a/24 < ” = 2· úh < ”̂ (for which
free trade would not be welfare-dominating autarky in the absence of commodity taxes as
environmental instruments).
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Proof. See Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2.
The intuition is as follows. In the case of Nash trade policies, the importing country
accounting for consumption-generated pollution (Home) loses its strategic environmental
instrument whenever it engages in free trade, whereas in the case of Nash domestic
policies, non-discriminatory commodity taxes substituting environmental instruments can
still be used under free trade. That is, as compared to Nash trade policies (import
tari s), Nash domestic policies (non-discriminatory commodity taxes) allow for a wider
range of the marginal disutility from pollution, within which free trade welfare-dominates
autarky. Moreover, if we consider the trade regime that generates the highest welfare for
a given marginal disutility from pollution, Nash trade policies lead to even a smaller range
(0 < ” < a/6; see Proposition 3), within which free trade will be welfare dominating,
whereas free trade (with a positive commodity tax imposed by Home) will be maintained
under Nash domestic policies whenever ” < ”̂ where a/6 < ”̂.10
Using Propositions 2, 3 and 5 , we can now show that
Proposition 6 For su ciently small values of the marginal disutility from pollution,
the importing country accounting for pollution from consumption of the imported good
(Home) prefers Nash domestic policies (non-discriminatory commodity taxes) over Nash
trade policies (import tari s), whereas for su ciently high values of the marginal disutility
from pollution, this policy preference is reversed.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Although Nash domestic policies increase the range of the marginal disutility from pol-
lution, within which free trade can be welfare dominating, they are less e ective for
su ciently high values of the marginal disutility from pollution. If the marginal disu-
tility from pollution is su ciently small such that free trade can be welfare dominating,
imposing a positive commodity tax will not much distort local consumption (as the tax
rate will be su ciently small), while it will e ectively decrease pollution via decreasing
consumption of the imported good. If, however, the marginal disutility from pollution is
su ciently high such that free trade cannot be welfare dominating (and assuming they
can set tari s freely for polluting imports), then it would be optimal that countries either
engage in (one-way or bilateral) trade and impose positive import tari s under Nash
trade policies, or stay in autarky under Nash domestic policies. In such a situation, it is
already clear that they will prefer trade under Nash trade policies.
10Note that Foreign’s welfare under free trade (with a positive commodity tax imposed by Home) is
larger than its welfare under autarky, for any ” Æ 0.77 (see Appendix A.2).
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5 Extensions and discussions
In this section, we extend the model to a symmetric case such that there are no non-
pecuniary benefits from imports in Foreign, and thus imports pollute in both countries
and are appropriately accounted for in welfare computations. In addition, we introduce
transboundary pollution to the model. In particular, we would like to delineate whether
(and to what extent) our results from the previous sections hold true.
While consumer and firm behavior is the same as before, each country now has a sym-




i = fii +
b(xi + yi)2
2 + (ti ≠ ”i)xi ≠ ◊”jxj, i ”= j œ {h, f} (10)
and that in the case of Nash domestic policy, equation (7) changes to
Ê
·
i = fii +
b(xi + yi)2
2 + ·i(xi + yi) ≠ ”ixi ≠ ◊”jxj, i ”= j œ {h, f} (11)
where ◊ œ [0, 1] represents the strength of leakage (transboundary pollution) from coun-
try j to country i decreasing country i’s welfare. Maximizing equation (10) w.r.t. ti, and









2 , i = {h, f}. (12)
Following remarks are in order. Unlike the previous (asymmetric) case, in the case
that imports pollute in both countries, the optimal tari  and tax rates are symmetric.
The higher is a country’s marginal disutility from pollution, the higher is its optimal
tari  or tax rates. Although both countries now attempt to internalize the consumption
externality by imposing tari  or tax rates that are increasing with their marginal disutility
from pollution, the increase is still less than their marginal disutility from pollution. It is
worth noting that given the linear environmental damage function in the welfare function,
transboundary pollution does not change the optimal rates. Moreover, it is clear from
equations (1) and (12) that a su ciently high marginal disutility from pollution in country
i (i.e., ”i > a/4) makes its optimal tari  rate prohibitive (i.e., túi > a/2) at which country i
will stop importing from country j, i ”= j œ {h, f}.
We can now show that
Lemma 2 One-way trade may be the case if and only if the two countries have su ciently
asymmetric marginal disutility from pollution such that ”j < a/4 < ”i may lead to exports
only from country i to country j.
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It is straightforward to show that one-way trade cannot be the case should the two
countries have identical marginal disutility from pollution. Moreover, it is worth noting
that both Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 assume that there is no restriction on tari  bounds,
which may not be the case in reality. The main motivation behind such an assumption is,
however, that we would like to discuss also the extreme impact of negative consumption
externality on the optimal trade policy and the trade pattern.



























, i ”= j œ {h, f}, (13)
and comparing this to autarky welfare (W úai = 3a2/8b, i = {h, f}), we can show that
Proposition 7 Free trade welfare-dominates autarky in country i, i = {h, f}, only if
both countries’ marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently small and the leakage
(transboundary pollution) is su ciently low such that ”i + ◊”j < 5a/24, i ”= j œ {h, f}.
Given that the condition in Proposition 7 should hold for both countries so that free
trade welfare-dominates autarky in both countries, it is straightforward to show that
”i < 5a/24(1 + ◊), i = {h, f} is a su cient condition under which both countries’ wel-
fare under free trade is greater than that under autarky. Comparing this to Propo-
sition 2, we can conclude that with transboundary pollution the threshold value of
marginal disutility (only below which free trade welfare-dominates autarky) gets lower
(i.e., 5a/24 > 5a/24(1 + ◊)).
In the case that there is only local pollution such that ◊ = 0, free trade welfare-dominates
autarky for su ciently low values of marginal disutility from pollution such that ”i <
5a/24. Proposition 5 has already shown that free trade can be welfare dominating not
only for ” < 5a/24, but also for higher values of ” so long as consumption taxes are
imposed increasing this threshold. This holds true also for the case that imports pollute
in both countries and the trading partner’s marginal disutility is su ciently low. We can
show this following Lemma 3 given below.
Lemma 3 There is a threshold value of marginal disutility from pollution in each country
(as a function of the other country’s marginal disutility and the strength of transboundary
pollution), denoted ”A/CTi (◊, ”j), only below which free trade implemented together with
consumption taxes welfare-dominates autarky. This threshold decreases not only as the
strength of transboundary pollution increases, but also with the other country’s marginal
disutility from pollution.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Appendix A.3 shows that when pollution is purely local such that ◊ = 0, for any ”j < ”j,
”
A/CT
i > 5a/24. We shall note that transboundary pollution decreases both ”j and ”
A/CT
i .
Equation (9) in Section 3 has shown that commodity taxes under free trade increase
welfare above free-trade welfare. This is, however, no longer the case when the other
country’s marginal disutility from pollution is strictly positive, such that
Proposition 8 There is a threshold value of marginal disutility from pollution in each
country (as a function of the other country’s marginal disutility and the strength of trans-
boundary pollution), denoted ”F T/CTi (◊, ”j), only above which free trade implemented to-
gether with consumption taxes welfare-dominates free trade without taxes.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
While this threshold decreases as the strength of transboundary pollution increases, it
increases with the other country’s marginal disutility from pollution in the case of pure
local pollution (i.e., ◊ = 0) or for su ciently weak transboundary pollution and for
su ciently low marginal disutility of the trading partner.
Comparing welfare under Nash trade policies to free trade, we can also show that
Proposition 9 There is a threshold value of marginal disutility from pollution in each
country (as a function of the other country’s marginal disutility and the strength of trans-
boundary pollution), denoted ”F T/NTi (◊, ”j), only above which Nash trade policies welfare-
dominate free trade.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Appendix A.4 also shows that (i) ˆ”F T/NTi (◊, ”j)/ˆ”j > 0 when pollution is purely local
such that ◊ = 0, or when transboundary pollution is su ciently weak (i.e., ◊ < 0.44 and
the trading partner’s marginal disutility is su ciently small such that ”j < a(4≠9◊)/4(4+
9◊), otherwise the threshold decreases with an increase in the trading partner’s marginal
disutility from pollution; (ii) ”F T/NTi (◊, ”j) decreases as the strength of transboundary
pollution increases; and (iii) ”F T/NTi (◊, ”j) tends to a/6 as both ◊ and ”j tend to zero just
as in the asymmetric case presented in Section 3. A higher value of ”j above zero increases
this threshold above a/6. That is, free trade welfare-dominates Nash trade policies even
for larger values of marginal disutility from pollution so long as the trading partner also
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has some higher marginal disutility from pollution. A special case is that both countries
have identical marginal disutility from pollution such that ”h = ”f = ”. In such a case,
when there is no transboundary pollution such that ◊ = 0, ” tends to 7a/34, which is
greater than a/6.
Finally, we can compare free-trade welfare when consumption taxes are introduced to
welfare under Nash trade policies, and show that
Proposition 10 There is a threshold value of marginal disutility from pollution in each
country (as a function of the other country’s marginal disutility and the strength of trans-
boundary pollution), denoted ”CT/NTi (◊, ”j), only above which Nash trade policies welfare-
dominate free trade implemented together with consumption taxes. This threshold de-
creases not only as the strength of transboundary pollution increases, but also with the
other country’s marginal disutility from pollution.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Proposition 3 in Section 3 has shown that for su ciently small values of the marginal
disutility from pollution, it is possible that Nash domestic policies are preferred over Nash
trade policies. Following Propositions 8, 9, and 10, it is possible to show that for some
constellations of parameter values (especially those with su ciently weak transboundary
pollution and su ciently low marginal disutility from pollution for the trading partner),
this result still holds true. Appendix A.4 presents an example of such a constellation of




In a simple reciprocal dumping model of trade, this study has scrutinized the strategic role
of trade and commodity taxes as environmental instruments when there is consumption-
generated pollution. Although statistical evidence suggests that consumption-generated
pollution constitutes a significantly large share of most industrialized countries’ total
emissions, the related literature (except for a greatly limited number of studies) has
mainly taken on board production as the main source of pollution and studied the strate-
gic use of environmental policy instruments. The main contribution of this study is
thus to study environmental pollution that is generated by consumption of an imported
good from a trading partner. In addition, in an attempt to discuss an empirically rel-
evant case, this study has introduced also some asymmetry among countries (especially
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in terms of their marginal disutility from pollution). As far as consumer-generated pol-
lution is considered, environmental taxes may be inapplicable, especially when countries
are not allowed to use domestic taxes to discriminate products according to the source
country. This study has shown that in such a situation, trade and commodity taxes
become important and can crucially a ect trade patterns, as they can be used not only
to generate tax revenues, to increase the domestic firm’s market share, and to correct
domestic distortions, but also to internalize the negative consumption externality.
According to our results, a su ciently high marginal disutility from pollution (or su cient
asymmetries between the countries in terms of their marginal disutility from pollution)
may jeopardize bilateral trade, especially if countries are given the option to set tari s
freely for imported goods (consumption of which generate environmental pollution). For
su ciently weak transboundary pollution and su ciently low marginal disutility from
pollution, (i) both Nash trade and domestic policies may prove to be helpful in ad-
dressing consumption-based pollution, and (ii) it is possible to show in such a case that
Nash domestic policies may be preferred over Nash trade policies, especially when both
transboundary pollution and the trading partner’s marginal disutility from pollution are
su ciently low. We shall note that in the analysis we have assumed no transport costs.
This, however, can be relaxed easily, and one can show that optimal taxes and/or tari s
decrease with an increase in transport costs. That said, the impact of transport costs on
welfare will not be monotonic.
While the current paper’s analysis is limited to homogeneous goods, it is equally impor-
tant to capture also the role trade and domestic policies play as environmental instru-
ments when products are both horizontally and vertically di erentiated. This, however,
deserves its own model. In such a model, one can include not only negative consumption
externalities, but also negative production externalities, which may allow for discussing
even a wider range of direct and indirect environmental instruments. We leave this,
however, to future research.
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Appendix A
A.1 Nash Trade Policies
As is already discussed, in the case that the two countries adopt Nash trade policies and
there is bilateral trade between these two countries, the optimal outputs, xi and yi, and
the maximized profits, fii, i = {h, f}, are given by equations (1) and (2), respectively, and
the optimal tari  rates, túi , i = {h, f}, that maximize welfare, Wi, i = {h, f}, are given
by equation (4). Substituting the optimal outputs, xi and yi, the maximized profits, fii,
i = {h, f}, and the optimal tari  rates, túi , i = {h, f}, back into the welfare expressions
given by equation (3) yields the maximized welfare levels, denoted W úti , i = {h, f}, where









65a2 ≠ 16a” + 32”2
162b . (A.1b)
If, however, the two countries engage in free trade (i.e., ti = 0, i = {h, f}), then the
maximized welfare levels, denoted W úfti , are given by equation (5). If there is autarky in
both countries, then the maximized welfare levels are W úai = 3a2/8b, i = {h, f}.
In the case of one-way trade (from Home to Foreign), we have already shown that Foreign
is always better o  by imposing an import tari , túf = a/3, in which case the maximized
welfare levels in Home and in Foreign are W úath = 251a2/648b and W úatf = 7a2/18b,
respectively, where superscript at stands for the regime in Home (autarky) and in Foreign
(trade with an import tari ), respectively. We will distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: The two countries are initially adopting Nash trade policies.
As is already discussed, if the marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently high such
that ” > a/4, Home’s tari  rate becomes higher than the prohibitive tari  rate implying
that cross-hauling will cease to exist, and there may be only one-way trade (from Home
to Foreign), in which case Foreign will impose an import tari , túf = a/3. Although
Foreign would be better o  had there been free trade (W úftf > W úatf > W úaf ), especially
as compared to one-way trade (with foreign import tari s), or to autarky, for Home,





h . Therefore, ” > a/4 may lead to one-way trade under Nash policy.
Suppose now the marginal disutility from pollution is such that a/6 < ” < a/4, that is,
Home’s tari  rate is less than the prohibitive tari  rate. In such a situation, although
free trade would improve welfare in Foreign (given ” < a/4, W úftf > W útf ), the marginal
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disutility from pollution is still too high such that Home is better o  by adopting Nash
trade policies. If, however, the marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently small





i , i = {h, f}, provided ” < a/6. Note that, autarky in both countries would
be welfare dominated in such cases.
Case 2: The two countries are initially in autarky.
As is already shown by Proposition 2, free trade cannot welfare-dominate autarky in Home
when the marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently high such that ” > 5a/24. Also,
as is already discussed, Foreign is always better o  by opening its market to trade and
by imposing an import tari , as compared to autarky. It is also straightforward to show
that welfare improves in Home (W úth > W úah ) should it open its market to trade and adopt
Nash trade policies. As we have already discussed above, as compared to free trade, Nash
trade policies improve welfare in Home if ” > a/6. Therefore, given a/6 < ” < a/4, free
trade cannot be welfare superior, but both countries will find it optimal to open their
markets to trade and will adopt Nash trade policies. As for ” > a/4, it is clear from
equations (1) and (4), and from Lemma 1 that Home’s tari  rate will be higher than the
prohibitive tari  rate, in which case one-way trade (from Home to Foreign) may be the
case. Not surprisingly, free trade may be welfare superior if the marginal disutility from
pollution is su ciently small such that ” < a/6 (completing the proof of Proposition 3).
A.2 Commodity Taxes and the Equilibrium Trade Regime
In the case that the two countries adopt Nash domestic policies, the optimal outputs, xi
and yi, and the maximized profits, fii, i = {h, f}, are given by equations (6) and (2),
respectively, and the optimal commodity tax rates, · úi , i = {h, f}, that maximize welfare,
W
·
i , i = {h, f}, are given by equation (8). Substituting the optimal outputs, xi and yi,
the maximized profits, fii, i = {h, f}, and the optimal tax rates, · úi , i = {h, f}, back
into the welfare expressions given by equation (7) yields the maximized welfare levels,
denoted W ú·i , i = {h, f}, where superscript · stands for the case that the two countries









16a2 ≠ 4a” + ”2
36b . (A.2b)
If, however, the two countries engage in free trade, and impose no tax/tari  (i.e., ·i =
ti = 0, i = {h, f}), then the maximized welfare levels, denoted W úfti , i = {h, f}, are
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which imply that Home is always better o  as compared to free trade by imposing a
positive commodity tax rate under free trade, whereas Foreign is worse o  as compared
to free trade when Home imposes a positive commodity tax rate. We can compare autarky
welfare and welfare under free trade (subject to a positive commodity tax rate imposed
only by Home), and show that
lim”æ”̂W
ú·
h = lim”æ”ÕW ú·f = W úai , i = {h, f},
where ”̂ ƒ 0.220487a and ”Õ ƒ 0.775255a > ”̂, and that W ú·h > W úah if and only if
” < ”̂, and W ú·f > W úaf if and only if ” < ”Õ, because ˆ[W ú·h ≠ W úah ]/ˆ” < 0 and
ˆ[W ú·f ≠W úaf ]/ˆ” < 0 for any ” < 2a. It is now clear that for a su ciently small marginal
disutility from pollution such that ” < ”̂, free trade can be maintained because the
two countries can improve welfare under free trade (as compared to autarky), provided a
positive commodity tax rate is imposed by Home (together with Appendix A.1 completing
the proof of Proposition 5).
Proposition 3 and Appendix A.1 have already shown that whenever the marginal disutility
from pollution is su ciently small such that ” < a/6, free trade is welfare superior in the
case of Nash trade policies (import tari s), in which case Home is unambiguously better
o  by imposing a positive (non-discriminatory) commodity tax rate (W ú·h > W
úft
h ) so
as to internalize the negative consumption externality. If, however, a/6 < ” < ”̂, the
two countries engage in trade and impose positive import tari s in equilibrium (Home
internalizes the negative consumption externality by imposing a higher tari  rate than
Foreign) under Nash trade policies (Proposition 3 and Appendix A.1), whereas free trade
(subject to a positive commodity tax rate imposed only by Home) is the equilibrium
trade regime under Nash domestic policies. In such a case, we can show that
lim”æ”̃[W ú·h ≠ W úth ] = lim”æ”̃
C




lim”æ”ÕÕ [W ú·f ≠ W útf ] = lim”æ”ÕÕ
C




where ”̃ ƒ 0.175249a < ”̂ and ”ÕÕ ƒ 0.46947a < ”Õ, and that W ú·h > W úth if and only
if ” < ”̃, and W ú·f > W útf if and only if ” < ”ÕÕ, because ˆ[W ú·h ≠ W úth ]/ˆ” < 0 and
ˆ[W ú·f ≠ W útf ]/ˆ” < 0, ’ ”. Therefore, Nash domestic policies leads to higher welfare for
both countries than that under Nash trade policies, if and only if a/6 < ” < ”̃ (completing
the proof of the first part of Proposition 6)
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If, however, ”̃ < ” < ”̂, then Home is better o  under Nash trade policies, whereas Foreign
is better o  under Nash domestic policies. In such a situation, we can show that (i) if the
two countries are initially under autarky, free trade (with or without commodity taxes)
cannot be welfare superior, because the marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently
high (in which case the two countries would trade and impose positive import tari s; and
(ii) if the two countries are initially trade partners, and are currently imposing import
tari s, free trade (with or without commodity taxes) cannot be welfare superior, either.
Finally, if the marginal disutility from pollution is su ciently high such that ” > ”̂,
under Nash domestic policies, autarky would be the case, with which welfare would
be dominated by the case under Nash trade policies (either by cross-hauling subject
to positive import tari s if ”̂ < ” < a/4, or by one-way trade subject to a positive
import tari  imposed by Foreign if ” > a/4). Therefore, free trade (subject to a positive
commodity tax imposed by Home) can be welfare superior if and only if the marginal
disutility from pollution is su ciently small. If, however, the marginal disutility from
pollution is su ciently high, then free trade (with or without commodity taxes) is not
welfare improving as compared to autarky, so the two countries prefer Nash trade policies
over domestic ones, because they can still engage in trade and impose import tari s, and
improve their local welfare (completing the proof of the second part of Proposition 6).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3 and Proposition 8
In the case that imports pollute in both countries with some transboundary pollution and
the two countries adopt Nash domestic policies, the optimal outputs, xi and yi, and the
maximized profits, fii, i = {h, f}, are given by equations (6) and (2), respectively, and
the optimal commodity tax rates, · úi , i = {h, f}, that maximize welfare, Ê·i , i = {h, f},
are given by equation (12). Substituting the optimal outputs, xi and yi, the maximized
profits, fii, i = {h, f}, and the optimal tax rates, · úi , i = {h, f}, back into the welfare
expression given by equation (11) yields the maximized welfare levels, denoted Êú·i , i =
{h, f}, where, as in the previous sections, superscript · stands for the case that the two





16a2 ≠ 4a(1 + 3◊)”j + (1 + 6◊)”2j ≠ 3”i(4a ≠ ”i)
36b , i = {h, f}. (A.5)




i = 3a2/8b shows that Êú·i Ø W úai for any ”i Æ ”
A/CT
i (◊, ”j), where
”
A/CT
i (◊, ”j) = 2a ≠
Û
19a2 + 8(a + 3a◊)”j ≠ 2(1 + 6◊)”2j
6 .
It is straightforward to show that (i) ˆ”A/CTi (◊, ”j)/ˆ”j < 0 for any ”j < a(1+1/(1+6◊)),
where the RHS of the inequality ranges between 2a and 1.4a for ◊ œ [0, 1]; and (ii)
ˆ”
A/CT
i (◊, ”j)/ˆ◊ < 0 for any ”j < 2a. Also we can now show that when pollution is
purely local such that ◊ = 0, ”A/CTi > 5a/24 for any ”j < 0.0328214a.
As for the proof of Proposition 8, we can compare free trade welfare Êúfti , given by
equation (13), to welfare under consumption taxes Êú·i , given by equation (A.5), and
show that Êú·i Ø Ê
úft
i for any ”i Ø ”
F T/CT
i (◊, ”j), where
”
F T/CT
i (◊, ”j) =
Û
”j(4a ≠ (1 + 6◊)”j)
3 .
It is straightforward to show that (i) ˆ”F T/CTi (◊, ”j)/ˆ”j > 0 for any ”j < 2a/(1 + 6◊),
where the RHS of the inequality ranges between 2a and 0.286a for ◊ œ [0, 1]; and (ii)
ˆ”
F T/CT
i (◊, ”j)/ˆ◊ < 0.
A.4 Proof of Propositions 9 and 10
In the case that imports pollute in both countries with some transboundary pollution
and the two countries adopt Nash trade policies, the optimal outputs, xi and yi, and the
maximized profits, fii, i = {h, f}, are given by equations (6) and (2), respectively, and
the optimal tari  rates, túi , i = {h, f}, that maximize welfare, Êti , i = {h, f}, are given
by equation (12). Substituting the optimal outputs, xi and yi, the maximized profits, fii,
i = {h, f}, and the optimal tari  rates, túi , i = {h, f}, back into the welfare expression
given by equation (10) yields the maximized welfare levels, denoted Êúti , i = {h, f}, where,
as in the previous sections, superscript t stands for the case that the two countries adopt




65a2 ≠ 2a(8 + 9◊)”j + 8(4 + 9◊)”2j ≠ 18”i(a ≠ 2”i)
162b , i = {h, f}. (A.6)
Lemma 2 has already shown that this case (bilateral trade) requires ”i < a/4, i = {h, f}.
We can now show that that ˆÊúti /ˆ”i < 0 for any ”i < a/4. Comparing equation A.6
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to free trade welfare Êúfti , given by equation (13), shows that Êúti Ø Ê
úft
i for any ”i Ø
”
F T/NT
i (◊, ”j), where
”
F T/NT
i (◊, ”j) =
2
Ò
(a + 2”j)(4a ≠ (4 + 9◊)”j) ≠ 3a
6 .
It is straightforward to show that (i) ˆ”F T/NTi (◊, ”j)/ˆ”j > 0 when pollution is purely
local such that ◊ = 0, or when transboundary pollution is su ciently weak (i.e., ◊ < 0.44
and the trading partner’s marginal disutility is su ciently small such that ”j < a(4 ≠
9◊)/4(4 + 9◊), otherwise the threshold decreases with an increase in the trading partner’s
marginal disutility from pollution; and (ii) ˆ”F T/NTi (◊, ”j)/ˆ◊ < 0. Also we can now show
that when pollution is purely local such that ◊ = 0, ”F T/NTi tends to a/6 as ◊ tends to
zero. Also as ◊ tends to zero, when both countries have identical marginal disutility from
pollution, ”F T/NTi tends to 7a/34.
As for the proof of Proposition 10, we can compare free trade welfare under consumption
taxes Êú·i , given by equation (A.5), to welfare under tari s Êúti , given by equation (A.6),
and show that Êú·i Ø Êúti for any ”i Æ ”
CT/NT
i (◊, ”j), where
”
CT/NT
i (◊, ”j) =
Ò
214a2 ≠ 5”j(4a(1 + 18◊) + (55 + 90◊)”j) ≠ 12a
15 .
Also we can show that (i) ˆ”CT/NTi (◊, ”j)/ˆ”j < 0; and (ii) ˆ”
CT/NT
i (◊, ”j)/ˆ◊ < 0.
Finally, we can illustrate that in the case of pure local pollution such that ◊ = 0, for any
”j < 0.022807a, ”CT/NTi (◊, ”j) > ”
F T/NT
i (◊, ”j). In such a case, we can show that for any
”
F T/NT
i (◊, ”j) < ”i < ”
CT/NT
i (◊, ”j), Êú·i > Êúti > Ê
úft
i , that is, country i prefers domestic
policies over trade policies.
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